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Summary  findings
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projects and varioLus  inLdicators  of coountry  governance.  liberties. (The average rate of return in the sample is 16
They find that:  percent.)
T'here is a strong statistical, and possibly causal, link  *  The type of political regime (whether authoritarian
berveen civil liberties and project performance.  After  or democratic) and the status of more purely political
conltrolling for a variety of determiiinalnts  of project  liberties do not appear to significantly affect project
performance, they find that in countries with the best  performance.
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Lant H. PritchettGovernance  and the Returns to Investment:  An Empirical Investigation'
Tntroductinn
The quality of governance is widely thought to be an important determinant of a country's
economic development (Brautigam 1992)2. However, to find convincing empirical evidence of
the effect of governance on economic  performance is a challenge.  Definitional and measurement
issues  plague  both  the  evaluation  of  inputs--what  is  the  appropriate  measurement  of  good
govemance?--and  of outputs--what is the effectiveness of government?3. We are able to make
empirical progress in exploring the connection between the governance and economic performance
only  by  severely  limiting our  focus.  We first  isolate one  observable  indicator of economic
performance: the returns on investment projects of governments that were financed by the World
Bank.  We then relate this performance indicator to just two limited dimensions of governance:
a) the degree of civil liberties; and b) the political regime type and the degree of political liberties.
Despite the serious definitional and measurement  problems with each of these indicators (discussed
Isham:  the IRIS  Center at the University  of Maryland. Kaufmann  and Pritchett:  the  World  Bank. We
would like to thank Deon Filmer and Phil Keefer  for helpful  comments.  One caveat,  although  standard,
deserves special mention given potential  sensitivity  of the topic: all views presented in this paper are
exclusively  those of the authors and do not necessarily  reflect  those of the World Bank.
2  For instance,  the World  Bank's policy  statement  on governance  and development  summarizes:  'Good
governance is central to creating and sustaining  an environmnent  which fosters strong and equitable
development,  and it is an essential  component  to sound  economic  policies."  (World  Bank  1992).
3 Creating an objective  measure of the efficacy  of government  action is plagued  by both normative
disagreements  about the appropriate  aims of government  policy and positive disagreements  about the
instruments  empirically  likely to achieve  any given  aim. For example,  a government  may  be very effective
(and even cost effective  in the limited  sense of achieving  a given  objective)  at banning  imports;  yet this is a
policy  which  many  may regard as an ineffective  and inefficient  (in the broad sense)  action  for a government
to undertake. See Putnam  (1993)  for ingenious  attempts  to avoid  these problems  and measure  government
efficacy.as they arise) we feel that the data are of sufficient quality and interest to merit examination.
The  first  section  describes  the  data  (particularly  the data  on  project  performance),
establishes  the basic specification of the determinants of project performance excluding governance
variables,  and  introduces  our  classification  of  governance  variables.  The  second  section
establishes  the positive link between  the degree of civil liberties and project performance and
argues  that this relationship is causal.  The third section shows the lack of such a relationship
between  either political  liberties  or  political  regime  type.  The  fourth  section discusses  the
interpretation  and  implications  of  the  empirical  results.  The  conclusion,  as  is  customary,
concludes.
II  Data description, hasic specificrtinn and results
A  Project  dat
The data on the performance of projects is assembled by the World Bank's  Operations
Evaluation Department (OED) 4. After e wch  World Bank loan is fully disbursed--typically 5 to 8
years after the opening of the loan--Bank and borrower country staff write a Project Completion
Report (PCR) to assess project performance5. As one part of this assessment, two performance
4  We do not differentiate  projects financed  by the IBRD  (International  Bank for Reconstruction  and
Development)  loans, which  are relatively 'hard" loans at near commercial  terms, and IDA (International
Development  Association)  credits, "soft'  loans restricted to the poorest countries.  Private sector IFC
(International  Finance  Corporation)  loans are not included  in this analysis.
5  The PCR-recently rechristened  the Implementation  Completion  Report--is  usually  written  by a staff
member in the division  that supervised  the loan, but not  by anyone  with major project responsibilities.  As
such,  the  incentives  of the  staff  to dissemble  about  project  performance,  while  present,  are not overwhelmingly
strong.
-2 -indicators  are created.  For all projects,  OED staff assign an overall performance indicator on
whether the project was 'satisfactory' or  'unsatisfactory'  in achieving its development objectives.
For those projects in eight economic  sub-sectors  where the stream of project  benefits can be
readily  quantified  and  valued--infrastructure,  agriculture,  industry,  energy,  water,  urban,
transport, and tourism--Bank project staff,  sometimes in collaboration with OED staff, calculate
an ex post economic rate of return (ERR)6.
The ERR is the discounted stream of project costs and benefits over the life of the project,
evaluated  at economic (as opposed to financial)  prices.  Typically, it is calculated by roughly
following the methodology of Squire and van der Tak (1975)'.  The ex post ERRs are typically
calculated about two to three years after project  completion, in contrast to ex ante ERRs which
are  calculated  when the project  is  first  assessed 8. Thus,  at  the time  the  ex post  ERRs  are
calculated, project evaluators know the actual investment costs and are somewhat better informed
about actual operating costs and demand; but they still must estimate most of the future stream of
benefits'.
6  Assessing  adjustment  lending  is a whole other kettle  of fish, a ketde which  has been fried on several
occasions  both  byi.he  World  Bank  and its staff (World Bank 1991, 1992, 1993;  Pritchett  and Summers 1993)
as well as others  less sympathetic.  We exclude  adjustment  operations  from our universe  of projects. For a
discussion  of project  performance  and adjustment  lending,  see Isham  and Kaufmann  (1992).
'  Little and Mirlees  (1992)  discuss  the degree of importance  of economic  (versus  financial)  pricing in
World  Bank appraisals  and the quality  of cost-benefit  analysis  overall.
'There is an enormous  gap  between  the ERR calculated  ex ante  and ex post (between  6 and 10 percentage
points  on average)  and  a huge  variability  between  these  two  measures (the  R2 of regressing  ex post on ex ante
only about 0.2).  The determinants  of this gap have been studied  but are difficult  to determine  (Pohl and
Mihaljek, 1992).
9 Follow-up  studies  tend  to find that even the ex post ERRs  tend  to overstate  the "true"  rate of return as
in many cases, the  benefit  flows  are not sustained  as long as anticipated  in the ex post ERR calculations.
- 3 -Table  1 shows the basic information about the ERR and overall ratings used in this
analysis, decomposed  by region, from 1974 to  199310. The average  rate of return was 16.1
percent. The ERRs  varied  substantially  across regions, from nearly 18 percent  in both South and
East  Asia to only 14 percent in Sub-Sabaran  Africa.  About 73 percent  of projects  were rated as
satisfactory, ranging from 83 percent in East Asia to only 64 percent in Africa.
Table 1:  Summary  statistics  of project performance (1974-1993)
Region  Economic  Rate of return (ERR)  Fraction of projects rated as
. _________________  "Satisfactory"
Region  Average  Number of  Average  Number of
l  _____________  projects  projects
All  16.1  1824  0.73  3435
South Asia  17.9  235  0.78  439
East Asia _  17.7  340  0.83  588
EMENA  17.1  338  0.81  613
Latin America  15.5  364  0.70  701
Sub-Saharan  14.0  547  0.64  1094
A  frica  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Notes:  Includes  all  projects  evaluated  by the World Bank's Operations  Evaluation
Department  from 1974  to 1993.
Source: Authors' calculations  from OED data.
R  Rasic specificatinn and clacssification of  independent variahles
In this paper, we are focused  only on the relation between selected  aspects  of
'1 An annual  publication  by OED  on evaluation  results (e.g. World  Bank 1993)  uses this data to examine
project performance  by a number  of characteristics.
-4  -governance  and project performance. Nevertheless,  we must still account  for country
structural  and policy characteristics  which, as previously shown (Isham and Kaufmann  1995,
Kaufmann  and Wang 1995)  are determinants  of project success. Accordingly,  for each
governance  variable tested, we estimate  four specifications  which include various  degrees  of
control variables: a) country and structural characteristics  only; b) these variables  plus
regional  dummies; c) country and structural characteristics  with "policy" variables;  and d)
these variables  plus regional  dummies" 1.
By estimating and reporting  each of these specifications,  we are able to explore  possible
endogeneity  of policy variables  and governance  variables. The independent  variables  have
been classified as follows:
*  Exogenous  and/or structural variables (denoted Xs), including the country
capital/labor  ratio, terms  of trade changes, and a dummy for project complexity12;
* Possibly endogenous  policy  and economic variables (denoted Zs) that could be
correlated with each other and/or with the governance variables, including  the black
market premium, the fiscal deficit, and GDP growth;
*  Regional dummies  for South Asia, East Asia, Sub-Saharan  Africa, Latin  America,
and Europe and the Middle  East.
When only structural  variables  are included (specifications  A and B) the estimate  of the
"  We  did not  include  sectoral  dummies  in the base  case  although  there  are differences  across  sectors
(whether  this  is  due  to real  differences  or methodologies  is unclear). Their  inclusion  does  not  appear  to affect
the results  as country  portfolio  composition  does  not appear  to be correlated  with the other  dependent
variables.
12  Following  Isham  and  Kaufnann  (1995),  this  includes  all integrated  rural  development,  irrigation  and
drainage,  and  livestock  projects.
-5  -partial impact  of better governance  on project performance  could be overstated  because  of
omitted  variables  bias, conversely, when policy variables are included  (specifications  C and
D), this estimate could understate  the true total impact  of governance  if part of the impact  of
better governance  is through better  policies" 3.
The inclusion  of the regional  dummies, which are obviously exogenous,  is simply  a
robustness  torture (for us) test. In order to be persuasive  we feel the results should  survive the
introduction  of regional fLxed  effects; otherwise, the results may simply be capturing  some
other unmeasured  historical, cultural  or ideological  effect that covaries across  regions and is
perhaps  correlated with both project returns and the governance  variables.
C  Basic  resuits without governance variahles
Three econometric issues  related to the project evaluation data deserve  mention  before
reporting the base case results.  First, the ERRs are truncated from below as, according  to
OED convention  the lowest ERR reported is negative 5 percent.  Thus, unless  otherwise  noted,
the reported results use a Tobit regression 14. Second, we must match the time period of the
3  If the set of equations  for determining  the rate of return on project with governance  (G), exogenous
ERR,  =  3*Gi  + 6*X] +cx*Z. + e,
Zj  =  y *Gi+Tl,
variables  (X),  and policy  variables  (Z) is as above, then  the pardal effect of governance  holding  all variables
constant (including  those that normally  would  be affected) is just P. The total effect  of governance,  which
includes  the effect of governance  through  its effect on policies  (Z), is P  +a *y.
"  In some  circles,  the Tobit  regression  is out of favor because  it is non-robust,  as its parameter  estimates
depend  on the  assumption  of normally  distributed  error term.  Since a relatively  small  fraction  of this sample
is at the truncation  point  of -5 percent, the Tobit  estimates  are quite similar  to simple  OLS  (Greene  1981).
-6 -time varying  variables, such as black market premium or terms of trade, to the period relevant
to the dependent  variables, the economic  rate of return on projects. This is difficult, as the
projects are implemented  over a long (on average  seven years) and variable period and are
expected to yield benefits over an extended  period as well.  While there are arguments  in favor
of various weights, we use a three year weighted average  of the time varying variable, going
back from the year in which the project evaluation  was done.  Third, although  the projects
vary tremendously  in total cost, from $1.7 million to $5.7 billion, we do not weight  the
projects, nor adjust for heteroskedasticity,  as the standard tests did not indicate any conditional
heteroskedasticity  as a function of project size' 5.
T  he "base case" regressions--without  any governance  variable--are  presented  in table 2.
In table 2 and in the tables below, we report p-levels of the test whether the coefficient  is zero
rather than the usual test (t or chi-square)  statistics  themselves. The p-level is the significance
level at which the null hypothesis  could be rejected. A p-level of less than 0.05 indicates  a
rejection  of the null hypothesis  at (at least) the 5 percent level.  As noted above, specification
A is the regression  of the project ERR on exogenous  and structural variables (Xs) alone,
specification  B is the Xs with regional  dummies, specification  C is the Xs  -and  other possibly
endogenous  policy indicators (Zs), and specification  D is the full regression: Xs, Zs, and
regional  dummies.
The results in table 2 are substantially  the same as those of Isham and Kaufmann  (1995)
and hence will not be discussed  in any depth.  Most of the results are intuitive: ERRs  are
'  In  a preliminary  version  of this  paper  regression  results  were  weighted,  but  subsequent  analysis  revealed
that  the  results  were  not  affected  by the  weighting  (and  that  we  had  incorrectly  computed  the  weights).
-7 -lower with a larger capital-labor ratio,  greater project complexity, a higher black market
premia,  and a larger fiscal deficit. In addition,  even after controlling for all these factors,
ERRs are substantially lower in Sub-Saharan Africa and modestly lower in Latin America and
EMENA 16.
16  The regional  definitions  are based on the (then) standard  Bank groupings  into Latin America and
Caribbean,  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  South  Asia, East Asia, and the somewhat  mixed  bag of Europe, Middle  East
and North  Africa  (EMENA).
-8 -Table 2:  Non-g  vernance determinants  of project returns (ERRs):  1974-1987
Specification:
A  B  C  D
Exogenous  Exogenous  Exogenous  Exogenous,




ln(capital/labor)  -1.28  -1.73  -1.34  -1.39
(.029)a  (.050)  (.024)  (.122)
Dummy for project  -5.80  . -5.81  -4.99  -5.06
complexity  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0003)  (.0002)
Terms of trade  0.086  0.096  0.064  0.077
shock  (.278)  (.218)  (.417)  (.316)
Policy
Black market  -0.046  -0.040
premia  (.0001)  (.0001)
Fiscal deficit  0.178  0.229
(.194)  (.116)
GDP growth  0.233  0.056
(.272)  (.799)
Regional Dummiesb
East Asia  -0.61  -2.69
_________________  (.791)  (.246)
Latin America  -3.85  -4.90
(.140)  (.065)
EMENA  -6.13  -5.51
(.036)  (.071)
Sub-Saharan Africa  -8.54  -9.12
(.0001)  (.0001)
Notes: a) p-levels in parenthesis, b) based on World Bank regional classifications. Sample
size =  761.  Source: Authors' calculations
-9-Since we focus on the impact of governance variables, we will (as a presentational matter)
only report the coefficients of the various  governance  indicators when added to these four base
specifications  rather than repeat all the results for each control variable for each regression.  Little
of substance is lost in not repeating these results: none of the coefficients on any of the variables
above--including  the black market premia  and fiscal deficit--change dramatically or interestingly
with the inclusion of any of the governance  indicators 17.
D.  Measuring "governance"
Discussions of "governance" typically  generate more rhetorical heat than empirical light
as  politics, like religion, is a topic where beliefs are strong and reliable empirical measurement
is difficult.  Even a consensus on definitions  is elusive: what does one mean by "governance" or
especially "good  governance"? 18. There is probably  agreement on governance in the extremes.  A
stable democracy where basic prescriptive  human rights are honored and with a competent and
honest civil service would no doubt receive the label "good governance" from most observers;  by
contrast, an unstable autocracy  where human rights are abused and with a demoralized and corrupt
civil service would receive the label "bad governance".  There is probably also agreement that the
''  One final  econometric  note:  in order not to sacrifice  too many  observations  when  the  non-governance
control  variables  are missing,  we imputed  the mean  value  for missing  observations  on the fiscal  deficit  and then
included  in the estimation  a dummy  variable  interacted  with these  variables  for those  observations  for which
the data are imputed.  At least  in the case where the independent  variables  are uncorrelated,  this procedure
produces  consistent  estimates  for the  variables  with imputed  missings (by  packing  the impact  of measurement
error due  to imputation  onto  the  interactive  term) and at least  potentially  improves  the efficiency  of estimation
of the governance  variables  by not  throwing  out any observations  with data  on governance  because  of missing
values  of the control  variables.
IS  The  World  Bank's  policy  paper defines  governance  as "the  manner  in which  power is exercised  in the
management  of a country's  economic  and social resources  for development."  (World  Bank  1992).
- 10  -quality  of  governance can be  evaluated along  at  least  the  following three  dimensions:
accountability (including  legitimacy, institutional pluralism and participation), openness and
transparency,  and predictability  and the rule of law (Brautigam, 1992).
However,  even though  the many dimensions  of "good governance"  typically  covary (e.g.,
political stability, transparent  rule of law, competent administration,  democracy  and respect for
human rights), they are conceptually,  logically, and empirically distinct.  There are clearly
examples of  effective but non-democratic governments (e.g.  some East Asian countries),
democratic but  corrupt governments (e.g.  some South Asian countries), and democratic
governments which abuse  human  rights (e.g. some Latin American  countries). As an extreme
example,  the United  States  was inarguably  a democracy  in the ante-bellum  period, yet it tolerated
the most egregious  of human  rights violations: slavery.
In spite--and  because--of  all these  definitional  difficulties, we isolate  for analysis  only two
of the many possible elements  of governance:  the extension of civil liberties;  and the extension
of political  liberties and type of political  regime.  As noted, these are regrettably  but necessarily
narrow  aspects  of governance.  We are ignoring a number of other potentially  important  factors:
we do not treat governmental  policy-making  (Haggard and Webb 1994), nor directly  measure the
degree  of government  accountability  (Paul 1992, 1994), nor address  political  instability  (Alesina
and Perroti 1993),  nor use other  indicators of govemrnent  performance, such as those generated
by private  rating services  for foreign  investors  (Mauro 1995, Knack and Keefer  1994) . We have
chosen  the civil and political  dimensions  for three reasons: they are at least plausibly  quantifiable,
and  empirical  measures  do exist;  they (albeit  imperfectly)  span the three dimensions  listed above--
accountability, openness, and the rule of law; and these same indicators of civil and political
- 11 -liberties are increasingly being tested in cross-country  growth regressions.
TI) Civil liberties and1  project  performance
A)  Indicators  of civil liberties
Developing  a meaningful cross-country  indicator of civil liberties is obviously difficult.
There  is little international consensus on liberties that ought to be permitted.  Moreover,  when
those liberties about which there might exist some consensus are suppressed, it is almost always
done surreptitiously.  That said,  several large efforts  have attempted to rank countries by degree
of civil liberties.  In this study, we use data from three of these efforts:
*  Freedom House 19 (1994 and previous years) has constructed a ranking of civil liberties
for 165 countries from 1972 to 1994.  This ranking--on  a seven point scale--is based upon
a fourteen item checklist of civil liberties 20;
*  Humana (1986) constructed an index of human rights achievement in 89 countries for
the year 1985.  This index, on a scale of zero to 100 (actual range is 13 to 98) was based
upon  the  definition  of human rights  adopted  by  the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1966 under the International  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
19 This index  is more commonly  known  as the Gastil  index, after its originator  (Gastil  1987).
20  The fourteen  items  are: media  free of censorship;  open public  discussion;  freedom  of assembly  and
demonstration;  freedom  of political  organization;  nondiscriminatory  rule of law in politically  relevant  cases;
free from unjustified  political  terror; free trade unions and peasant organizations;  free businesses  and
cooperatives;  free  professional  and  other  private  organizations;  free religious  institutions;  personal  social  rights
(e.g. property, internal and external  travel); socioeconomic  rights; freedom from gross socioeconomic
inequality;  and freedom  from gross  government  indifference  or corruption.
- 12 -*  Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) constructed five series on upolyarchy" 22 in 170 countries
for the year 1985.  We use "media pluralism"  and 'freedom  to organize'  as indicators of
two fundamental civil liberties.
While  each  of these indices of civil  liberties are  subjective and debatable, their cross
correlations  are reasonably high, which creates some confidence that they measure the same thing
and do so reasonably well  (although  we note that, since Coppedge and Reinicke used the Freedom
House and Humana studies in their own ranking procedure,  part of the high correlation between
'  "The set of institutional  arrangements  that permits public opposition  and establishes  the right to
participate  in politics" (Coppedge  and Reinicke  1990). The other series are 'fair elections",  "extension  of
suffrage",  and "freedom  of expression".  We do not  report the results  on these series because  they  either  have
less  variance  and/or  capture  politica  freedoms.  Consistent  with reports reported  below on political  indicators,
they are in no case statistically  significant  across  specifications.
- 13 -the latter  two and former two series is by construction)3.  However, we wish to stress that by
using  these  rankings  neither  the authors-nor especially  the World Bank--place  any importance  on
the ranking  for any particular  country.  Moreover, by using these numbers strictly for our cross-
sectional  econometric  exercise, we do not imply acceptance  of the numbers nor any comment  on
the politics, rights, or practices of any country.
R) Civil fiherties and prnject performance
Table 3 shows the results of including each of the measures of civil liberties in the project
performance regressions.  There is a consistent, statisdcally significant and empirically large effect
23  The  correlations  amongst  the 'civil liberties"  measures  are:
FH Civil  (79-86)  Humana  CR Organize
Humana  0.83
CR Organize  0.78  0.68
CR Media  0.81  0.79  0.82
24  If different  observations  on 'civil liberties,"  say A (Freedom  House)  and B (Humana)  differ only  by
independent  measurement  error  then  the  correlation  between  the  two  measures  is
02
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  2  2  2
p  =  X  ,where  a(.  is the variance of the "true'  variable and  is the
measurement error  variance for  measurement A(B).  If  the measurement error  variance is equal
a  5  then  a correlation  of .8 implies  the ratio of measurement  error (noise)  to the variance  of
(2
the true variable  (signal),  g  is about .2.
- 14-of civil liberties on the return to projects25. Taking the estimates  from specification  D, if the
Freedom  House  civil  liberties  index  were to improve  from the worst (1) to the best  (7, as in Costa
Rica for all evaluated years), the  ERR is predicted to  increase by 7.5  percentage points.
Similarly, with the estimates  using the Humana index, improving  from the worst civil liberties
(13)  to one of the best (91, as in Costa  Rica) would improve  the ERR by 22.5 percentage points.
Since these civil liberties indices are on a different scale, a more standard method for
comparison  is to calculate  how  much the ERR is predicted  to increase  if each index were improved
by one standard  deviation  (column  5).  An increase  of this magnitude  in the Freedom House index
would  raise  the predicted  ERR  by 1.6 points; a similar increase  in the Humana index would raise
the ERR by 5.2 points; a standard deviation increase  in "media  pluralism" would improve the
predicted  ERR by 3.1 points.
5 For the Freedom  House  and the Coppedge  and Reinicke  indicators,  we have  reversed  the scales  for
comparability.  Thus, for all indices,  a higher  value represents  more liberties.
- 15  -Table 3:  Impact of civil liberties on project  rates of return
Specificationa:  Effect of
one std.
dev.
A  B  C  D  increase  on
________  _________  _______  ~~~ERR  d:
Freedom House  1.81  1.16  1.71  1.07  1.57
Civil (1978-  (.0005)c  (.079)  (.002)  (.114)
1987)b (N =  649)
Humana (1982-  .290  .299  .296  .289  5.19
1985)  (.003)  (.007)  (.002)  (.013)
(N=236)_
Media pluralism  4.61  4.45  3.66  3.43  3.12
(1983-1987)  (.0001)  (.002)  (.001)  (.026)
(N=448)
Freedom to  3.17  1.81  2.41  -0.26  2.70c
organize  (1983-  (.0001)  (.184)  (.006)  (.854)
1987) (N =448)  I ___
Notes: a) for description  of the specifications  see table 2; b) Annual  values from 1978-
87.  The other three indices  are single values extrapolated  to cover the listed time
period; c) p-levels in parenthesis;  d) for the calculation in column V, the standard
deviations--for  the entire  sample  for which each variable is available--are  1.47, 17.97,
0.91 and 1.12 respectively  (see appendix  table Al.1);  e) uses estimate  from column C.
Source: Authors' estimates.
This  finding  of a positive  relationship  between civil  liberties  and  ERRs is the central
positive  finding  of our paper. We complete  this section  by showing  the statistical  robustness  of
this finding;  we argue  in the following  section  that it is plausible  that  better civil  liberties  actually
are a factor in producing  better  projects.
One  possible  concern  with  the econometric  results  above  is that  they are driven  by a few
outlying  observations,  as some  projects  have very high estimated  rates of return. We have dealt
with that problem  in two ways. First, in addition  to a Tobit specification  accounting  for the lower
- 16  -truncation,  we truncated  the ERRs  above at the more or less arbitrary  level  of a 50 percent  rate of
return. This  truncation  did  not affect  the results. Second,  we in addition  to OLS,  we estimated
specification  D using quantile  (median)  regression,  a technique  that is more  robust  to extreme
observations. Again,  all  the civil  liberties  variables  that were significant  in specification  D in table
3 were statistically  significant  using  median regression  estimates.
The results are qualitatively  similar with the binary 'satisfactory/unsatisfactory"  rating.
Using only this rating as the measure  of project performance allows a larger sample  of
projects, as social sector  projects  that normally do not receive an ERR are rated by OED'2.
Table 4 reports the estimates  of a Probit regression for specifications  C and D (results for A
and B were similar). Naturally,  since the binary indicator discards  a great deal of statistical
information, these results are less  precise: the p-levels are lower, and the estimates  for the
Humana ranking are insignificant. For the other variables, the estimates  show  large increases
in the likelihood of a good project when implemented  under higher civil liberties. For
instance, at the mean of the Freedom  House variable, a one standard  deviation  increase  in civil
liberties would lower the probability  of an unsatisfactory  project by  3.2 percentage  points,
which reduces  the predicted  failure  rate by 16 percent (from the mean of 20 percent).
Similarly, a one standard  deviation  improvement in media pluralism  would  reduce  the failure
rate by almost 5 percentage  points, or 25 percent from the mean 7.
26  See Kaufmann  and Wang  (1995)  for a discussion  of the performance  of social  sector  projects as a
function  of macroeconomic  policies.
2  The comparison  between  the linear regressions and the Probit effects is complicated,  but these
magnitudes  are roughly  similar. That is, if we created a dummy  variable  for 'unsatisfactory"  based on the
ERR faiing  below  some  critical  level,  then  the  marginal  change  in probability  of failure  from  the linear model
at a particular  point (if the error term were normal) would  be PIo*o(.), where P is the slope  coefficient,  o
- 17 -Table 4:  Impact of civil liberties on the probability of a project being rated as
satisfactory,  using Probit regression.
Specification:
C  D
Freedom House Civil (1 9 78 _ 90 )b  .018c  .022
N=  1155  (.056)d  (.060)
Humana (1982-86)  -.00067  .0012
N=604  (.589)  (.388)
Media pluralism (1983-90)  .022  .054
N=740  - (.296)  (.045)
Freedom to organize (1983-90)  .042  .040
N =740  (.009)  (.085)
Notes: a) for description  of the specifications  see table 2, b) Annual values from 1978-87
while for the other three indices  are single values for the listed time period; c) the value
reported is not the Probit coefficient,  but the marginal change in the probability  of a
successful  project as the variable  changes, evaluated at the means of all independent
variables;  d) p-levels of the test that the Probit coefficient is zero in parenthesis.
Source: Authors' calculations
C) Civil liberties and  project  performance Disentangling  cauIsality
This empirical relationship  between  performance of projects and civil liberties  is
striking.  Yet the interpretation  of this partial correlation is problematic: it may  well be that
some country  conditions cause  both greater civil liberties and better projects.  We argue in two
ways that the results suggest  a causative  effect from better civil liberties to better  project
performance. First, prior work suggests  that beneficiary involvement  and accountability  of
is the error standard  error, and  4() is the  standard  normal  pdf evaluated  at a particular  point. Taking  the
values  from the  regressions  in table  3, the  means  of ERR from table 1, and an estimate  of a gives  results from
.0266=1.07/14.7*@  ((16.1-10)/14.7)  (specification  D) and .042  = 1.71/14.7*¢((16.1-10)/14.7)  which are
slightly  higher  than the estimates  of .018  and .022 from Probit.
- 18 -implementing  officials are both key elements  of project success: both of these facets of
governance  could suggest a mechanism  for a causal link between civil liberties  and
performance. Second, we show  that the data between manifestations  of civil strife and project
success  show a positive effect that is best understood  as a mediating mechanism.
1) Other literature  civil liberties and performnance
Experience  in developing  counties  illuminates  two aspects  of governance  related  to civil
liberties  that affect project performance.
Beneficiary  involvement  and  participation.  There is increasing  consensus  among  aid
agencies  that input from and involvement  of potential  beneficiaries  in government  investment
projects is key to their success  (e.g. World Bank 1995). Myriad case studies (e.g., Korten and
Siy 1988) illuminate  the mechanisms  between beneficiary  participation and performance.
Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett (1995)  use data from 121 water projects to show  that greater
participation  by potential beneficiaries  directly caused  better project performance. It is likely
that beneficiary  involvement  in projects is greater in countries which score higher on a ranking
of civil liberties.  At least six of the 14 elements  of the Freedom House civil rights  index, for
example, are directly compatible  with beneficiary  participation  in projects: media  free of
censorship,  open public discussion,  freedom of assembly  and demonstration,  free trade unions,
peasant organizations,  businesses  or cooperatives,  free professional  or other private
organizations,  and freedom from gross government  indifference  or corruption.
Public sector accountability. A related  dimension  of the performance  of government
projects is the degree to which the public sector officials are held accountable  for their
- 19  -performance. For an extreme instance, Dreze and Sen (1991), in their study of famines
elaborate  on the fact that no major famine has ever happened in a country with a free press.
They postulate  that free flow of information  forces even non-democratic  governments  into
actions to prevent economic  catastrophes  such as famines. Empirical studies of accountability
are rare, but suggest that the degree to which public sector employees  are responsible  is an
important  dimension  to performance  (Wade 1994, Paul 1996).
Both greater beneficiary  involvement  and greater accountability  of public sector
officials  are facilitated  by an environment  in which basic civil liberties--such  as the freedom to
speak out and the ability of groups  to organize to protect and advance  their interests--are
recognized.
2) Civil unrest, civil liherties and project performance
Another intuitive argument  for a causal mechanism  between civil liberties and project
performance  is a chain that runs from civil liberties through indicators of civil unrest to project
perforrnance. The data suggest  that, controlling  for population, higher indicators  of civil
strife, such as an increased numbers  of riots, protest demonstrations  and strikes, is strongly
positively correlated with project performance.  This finding at first seems paradoxical, but we
show that greater civil liberties  are associated  with higher values of  these civil strife indicators
and that, controlling  for the degree of civil liberties, there is little additional impact  on project
performance.
Table 5 shows that countries  with high average  project performance  also have on
average  much higher levels of civil unrest.  When we sort countries into groups  based in their
-20 -average ERR, we find countries in the 'high  ERR'  category had average rates of return twice
as high as those countries in the "low ERR" category.  Interestingly, these high ERR countries
had many more riots, demonstrations and strikes per capita (adjusted for population effects)
than countries with poor project performance 28.
Table 5: Indicators of political and civil unrest by average ERR by country.
Indicators of political
ERR  Average  Number  Regional  Number  unrest,  averages per year
categorya  ERR  of  distribution  of  by country (deviations
countries  projects  from population-adjusted
means): 
Riots  Demon-  Strikes
strations
High  22.2  6  S. Asia: 3;  181  2.48  0.30  3.19
E Asia: 3
Medium  17  11  LAC: 5; SSA: 2;  253  0.00  0.16  -0.02
EMENA: 3;
S. Asia:  i
Low  11.2  12  SSA: 9; LAC: 2;  209  -0.19  -0.04  -0.23
S.  Asia:  1I___
Notes: a) ERR categories are determined by average rates of return classified by country for all
countries with at least 10 projects over the period from 1974-1987.
Source:  Autifors' calculations
2' The  civil  unrest  variables  (riots, protest  demonstrations,  and strikes,)  came as number  of incidents  per
country per year (Banks  1979,  updates). This meant that countries  with larger populations  had a greater
absolute  number  of incidents. However, it did not seem  right to simnply  normalize  to per capita,  as there is
plausibly  some increasing  returns to scale in civil unrest. Consequently,  for each of the three variables  we
regressed  the  absolute  number  of incidents  on population*ln(population)  (which is equivalent  to adjusting  the
per capita  level  for the  total  population  in semi-log  form) and report  the residual  of this regression  as 'excess'
civil  unrest  over  the  amount  expected  for a given  level  of population.  The  population  adjustment  was  also very
significant  and the R-squared  varied from .02 (strikes) to .18 (riots).  The results reported  below were
unchanged  by using  other concave  functional  forms in place of this semi-log  form.
-21 -That greater civil unrest is associated  with better projects appears  at first to be
puzzling. Typically, such  manifestations  are thought  to be associated  with worse performance.
However, all the projects  in this analysis are financed by governments  and, unlike in the
private sector, civil unrest does not create the same kind of risks for performance. By
contrast, there may be a channel  whereby civil tension leads to better project choice and
implementation. While markets for private goods rely on information  from consumers
(expressed  in the form of the aggregation  of individual  purchase decisions  made in the
market), governments  must rely on other channels  for expressions  of citizen's preferences  and
for the monitoring  of the performance  of government agents in carrying out their functions It
may be that with more open channels, all forms of expression  of popular will--including  civil
unrest--are greater.
What is the relationship  between the indices of civil liberties  and riots, strikes, and
demonstrations? Table 6 shows  that for all indicators except for Humana, greater civil
liberties are strongly  associated  with greater degrees of civil unrest.
- 22 -Table 6: Correlations  between  indices of civil liberties and civil unrest
Civil unrest
(all variables  adjusted for population  effects)'
Civil liberties
indicator  Riots  Demonstrations  Strikes
Freedom House  .27  .17  .34
(Civil)b  (.00001)  (.0001)  (.0001)l
(1978-87)  l  l
Humana  .06  -.01  .22
(1982-85)  (.34)  (.87)  (.0002)
Media Pluralism  .14  .24  .29
(1983-87)  (.0011)  (.0001)  (.0001)
Freedom to  .30  .29  .36
organize  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)
(1983-87)  ___
Notes: a) indicators  of civil unrest  per capita adjusted for total population
size as described  in footnote  28; b) Annual values from 1978-87. The
other three indices are single  values extrapolated to cover the listed time
period; c) p-levels in parenthesis.
Source: Authors' calculations
Table 7 uses the same regression  base specification  as above and shows  that there is, if
anything, a modest positive  effect of various indicators of civil unrest on project  returns.  In
both of the specifications  without  regional dummies, the number of riots, protest
demonstrations,  and political  strikes are positively  and significantly  related  to the rate of
return.  Projects apparently  do better in environments with greater civil strife when civil
liberties are not included  as a determinant  (e.g. a coefficient  of 0.56 in specification  A for
- 23 -riots).  However, with the addition  of any of the indicators of the degree of civil liberties 29,
the impact  of political manifestations  is reduced in magnitude.  For instance  the coefficient  on
riots falls from 0.56 to 0.32 in specification  A.  That is, for any given level of civil liberties,
neither riots nor strikes  are associated  with better performance, but protest demonstrations
seem to still have some independent  affect.
The results support a chain of causation that runs from greater civil liberties  to higher
levels of the citizen's involvement--including  civil manifestations--and  to better projects. This
is not to suggest that civil unrest is itself the mechanism: it is more likely that environments  in
which civil unrest is possible  are also those in which other mechanisms  for expression  of
popular (dis)content  with government  performances are available and effective.
9  Only the Freedom  House  civil indicator  is shown in table 8, but the results  for the other three are
similar.
- 24 -Table 7:  Indicators of civil unrest and project returns, without and with
controls for civil liberties.
Specificationa:
A  C  D
|  with
without  with  without  with  Freedom
Freedom  Freedom  House
House  House
Adding just riots
Riots  0.56  0.32  0.42  0.21  -0.34
(0.062)  (0.148)  (0.040)  (0.34)  (0.245)
Freedom House  1.48  - 1.51  1.19
Civil  (0.090)  (0.093)  l  (.083)
Adding just protest demonstrations
Protest  1.04  0.88  0.81  0.68  0.17
demonstrations  (0.0001)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.607)
Freedom House  - 1.46  - 1.48  1.08
Civil  (0.053)  (0.006)  (.112)
Adding just political strikes
Political strikes  1.58  0.201  1.67  0.45  -0.81
(0.127)  (0.857)  (0.097)  (0.683)  (0.520)
Freedom House  1.77  1.61  1.09
Civil  (0.002)  (0.006  I 09)
Adding all three civil strife variables
F-testc  for all three  4.39  3.66  2.69  2.30  1.09
indicators  without  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.045)  (0.076)  (0.352)
and with civil  l 
liberties  _  l  l  l  __  _
Notes: a) for a description of the specifications  see table 2; b) p-levels in
parenthesis;  c) F-tests calculated  with and without all three indicators. Sample  size
= 649.
Source: Authors' calculations.
- 25 -TV) Political  regime  tye  political  liberties  and  project  performance
Civil and political liberties are undoubtedly associated with each other and with
democratically-elected governments.  Yet there is a clear analytical distinction among these
two types of liberties and the type of political regime: for example,  the degree of civil and
political liberties varies widely among non-democracies.  Therefore,  finding that more civil
liberties are associated with better ERRs does not imply that different types of political regimes
are associated with better performance.  To try to disentangle these relationships, we test for
the possible association between ERRs and these two related aspects of governance: political
liberties and political regime type.
A) Political liberties
The most widely used measure of political liberties is an index also published by
Freedom House, based on 11 indicators of political rights 30. Like the ranking of civil
liberties, it is a subjective ranking from  1 to 731  Another possible measure of political
liberties is the index of human rights violations (IHRV) constructed by Pourgerami (1988),
based on reports of Amnesty International on the extent of human rights abuses for the years
30  The eleven  are: chief authority  recently  elected  by a meaningful  process; legislature  recently  elected
by a meaningful  process; fair election  laws; fair reflection  of voter preference in distribution  of power;
multiple  political  parties; recent shifts  in power through  elections;  significant  opposition  vote; freedom  from
domination  by the military, foreign  powers, and other powerful  groups; no major group or groups  denied
reasonable self-determination;  decentralized  political  power; and informal consensus  (de facto opposition
power).
31  In many  studies  (e.g., Helliwell  1992),  these  two closely  correlated  indices  are summed  to create  one
overall  index  of liberties.
- 26 -1984-86. It takes a value of 4 for the least and 1 for the most human rights abuses31.
Table 8:  Political liberties  and project performance
______  ______Specifiation 2:_  _  _  _  _  _  _
_________  A  B  C  D
Freedom House (Political)b  1.16  -.016  1.05  -.115
(N=649)  (.0087)c  (.977)  (.026)  (.840)
Index of Human Rights Violations  (IHRV) (N  =425)
Dummy variable  for each level of violations (default  is most violations,  IHR'  1)
iIHRV=2  5.46  3.33  4.23  2.92
(.018)  (.193)  (.078)  (.292)
IHRV=3  0.08  1.66  1.30  3.04
(.974)  (.534)  (.586)  (.310)
IHRV=4 (least violations)  0.90  3.96  4.87  7.83
l  _____________________  (.788)  (.297)  (.154)  (.045)
Notes: a) for description  of the specifications  see table 2; b) Annual values from 1978-
1987. IHRV is a single value extrapolated to cover 1980-1986;  c) p-levels in parenthesis.
Source: Authors' calculations
The results reported in table 8 do not show any striking  positive impact  of purely
political rights on ERR. The Freedom House index shows  a significant  positive effect in the
least demanding  specification  (A), but whereas civil liberties  is robust, the political result is
not.  It is driven out in significance  by the policy controls  and, in both magnitude  and
significance,  by the inclusion  of regional variables.
The index of human  rights violations (IHRV)  similarly  does not show  any clear pattern
of impact  on project  performance. Although in specification  D there is some significant
effect, the result is highly non-robust and appears to be driven by a few observations  with very
`2 Actually,  the  highest  possible  value on the scale is 5, which  only one country,  Jamaica,  achieves  so for
our purposes  Jamaica  is re-classified  to 4, the level  which  includes  Costa  Rica, Venezuela,  Mexico,  Singapore
and Nigeria  from 1984-86.
-27 -high ERRs 33. Besides  the possible  distinction between the top and the bottom, the results show
no clear pattern amongst  levels  of the index.  In most of the specifications,  while  countries
with the second to worst amount  of violations (IHRV  = 2) do better than countries  with the
most violations,  they also do much better than countries with an even better record (e.g. 5.46
for  RV=2 versus 0.08 for IHRV=3 in specification  A) and about as well as those with the
best record (e.g., 3.33 for IHRV=2 versus 3.96 for IHRV=4 in specification  B).  Therefore,
while there is some mild evidence  that it is better not to be in the worst group, there are no
discernible  distinctions  amongst  the other levels of IHRV
3 4.
These weak results on the importance  of civil liberties are the result of introducing  the
political variable into the base specification  without any indicator  of civil liberties. If we ask
what the effect of political  liberties  are, conditional on the level of civil liberties  we find that
the civil liberties indicators  retain all of their iInportance  while the Freedom  House political
liberties variable produces  weak,  or even results which suggest  a greater level of political
liberties, holding civil liberties  constant, worsens project performance. Table  9 shows that,
controlling  for civil liberties  raising  political liberties actually reduces the ERR. While not too
much should  be read into these results (as the multicollinearity  problems  involved  with the
estimation  of the variables  together  are severe) these do strengthen  the interpretation  that civil
liberties are of primary importance  in explaining project returns.
3  For instance  in a linear  regression  (for  simplicity),  while  the  coefficient  is 1.96  with  Tobit  estimation
(in  specification  D),  it falls  to  only  -.027  in a median  regression.  Similarly,  if the  ERRs  are  truncated  above
at 50 percentage  points,  the  estimate  falls  to 1.1 (with  a p value  of .207).
3'  Moreover,  being  in  the  worst  group  by this  indicator  may  simply  indicate  that  the  country  is involved
in a serious  civil  conflict,  and  hence  one  would  expect  disruption  of projects  independent  of any  exogenous
impact  on  liberties.
-28 -Table 9:  Estimated  impact  of political liberties on project returns (ERR)  while
introducing  civil liberties variables.
Civil liberties variable included in specification  D
Nonea  Freedom  Humana  Media  Freedom to
House (Civil)  (1982-85)  Pluralism  Organize
(1978-87)  (1982-87)  (1982-87)
Freedom House  -.115  -2.35  -1.44  -1.17  .040
(Political)  ( 8 4 0)b  (.013)  (.241)  (.175)  (.967)
Civil liberties  3.33  .365  4.53  .216
variable  (.0033)  (.006)  (.009)  (.906)
N  649  649  236  448  448
Notes: a) same regression  as table 8, b) p-levels in parenthesis.
R) Political regime  type
The first indicator  of regime type, developed by the Center on Institutional  Refonn
and the Informal Sector (IRIS)  and labeled  here as the 'IRIS Indicator of Regime  Type'
(IIRT), places countries annually  in one of five classes: democracy  (IIRT=5), partial
democracy; transition regime,  partial autocracy; and autocracy (IIRT= 1).  Matched  with our
project/policy data set, this includes  annual observations from 1974-1987  for 51 countries.
Since this indicator.  of different  regime types is not (necessarily)  a cardinal  variable, we
include a dummy variable  for each type.  The second indicator, constructed  by Alberto
Alesina et. al. (Alesina  et al. 1992) and labeled here the "Alesina  Democracy  Index"  (ADI), is
an annual ranking of countries  by democratic status on a scale of one (most  democratic)  to
- 29 -three. We use the annual  observations  from 1974-1982  for 48 countries.
The results from including  these either of these two measures of political  regime type in
the base specifications  are emphatically  ambivalent  (table 10).  The lowest ranking  group of
countries  by IIRT, the "autocracy",  tends to have a lower ERR than other categories  (as
evidenced  by the positive signs for most of the others).  In specifications  A and C (without
regional dunmmies),  IRT  categories  3 and 5 (most democratic) tend to have higher returns,
while in specification  D none of the differences  are empirically or statistically  significant.
Using the ADI, we also find in specifications  A and C some weak evidence  that more
democratic  regimes tend to have higher returns, but this is reversed by the inclusion  of
regional  controls.
Moreover, except for a comparison  between the "best"  and "worst"  regime  type, there
is no clear pattern to the results. For instance, the increment to returns over the autocracies  is
nearly as high when IIRT=3 as when IIRT=5,  and countries with IIRT=4 (partial
democracy)  are predicted  to have an ERR lower by 3.4 percentage points than  even
autocracies. The most democratic  (ADI= 1) countries are also predicted in specification  D (at
a very low level of significance)  to have lower returns than autocracies.
- 30 -Table 10:  Returns and political  regime type.
Specificationa:
A  B  IC  D
IRIS Indicator of Regime Type (IIRT) (1974-1987b; N=725)
Dummy variable by regime t ipe (default is least democratic,  IIRT=  1)
IIRT=2  -0.48  -0.56  0.24  0.49
(.767)  (.733)  (.885)  (.766)
IIRT=3  5.46  1.61  3.52  1.04
(.107)  (.636)  (.296)  (.757)
IIRT=4  -0.076  -3.68  -0.82  -3.35
(.967)  (. 058)  (.657)  (.091)
IIRT=5  (most democratic)  3.94  0.322  4.17  0.458
(.055)  (.892)  (.043)  (.847)
Alesina democracy index (ADI) (1974- 1982b;  N=369)
Dummy variable by democ  level, default is least democratic (ADI=3)
ADI=2  3.10  2.86  2.38  2.41
(.225)  (.257)  (0.349)  (.345)
ADI= 1 (most democratic)  2.93  -1.27  1.93  -1.52
1 (.117)  (.542)  (.311)  (.465)
Notes: a) for description of the variables included  in each specification  see table 2; b)
Annual values for time period; c) p-levels in parenthesis.
Source: Authors' calculations.
In summary, there is no clear pattern that suggests that countries with more democratic
regimes (as classified  by the available  indices)  have better projects, as measured  by ERRs.
The very least democratic countries  perhaps do more poorly than others, but moving  towards a
democracy  from other levels not have any empirically  discernible impact  on project returns.
- 31 -C)  Other liter2ntre  political  freedom  and performance
These ambiguous findings roughly  agree with other assessments of the degree of
political freedom on aggregate economic performance.  There is a sizeable literature which
examines the impact of "democracy" on aggregate growth (e.g.  Weede 1983, Scully 1988,
Helliwell 1992, Barro 1994, Bhalla  1994, see Alesina and Perotti,  1994 for a review), much
of which uses the Freedom House index of political liberties 35 as the measure of democracy.
While it is quite difficult to reconcile the strikingly different findings of these papers, in spite
of the fact they use almost identical dependent variables (economic growth) and measures of
political freedom, we think a fair summary of the current state of the macro level literature on
economic growth and political freedom would be involve six findings.
First, higher levels of income are associated with higher levels of the Freedom House
index of political liberties.  Second,  when some covariates are added, the level of the Freedom
House index of political liberties does not have independent explanatory power for growth of
per capita income.  Third, controlling for reverse causation--from economic growth (hence
higher levels of income) to political liberties--reduces the estimated effect of political liberties
on growth. Fourth,  the effect of political  liberties on growth seems to be non-linear, the
middle levels of the index (e.g East Asia) have higher levels of growth than either very low
(e.g.  OECD) or very high (e.g.  Africa) levels.  Fifth,  as with nearly all growth regressions, a
great deal depends on how the newly industrializing economies of East Asia are treated.  This
3  Or the sum  of the two Freedom  House indicators. Two other studies-(Kormendi  and Meguire  1985,
Greir and Tullock 1989)-use dummies  based on the Freedom  House civil index in cross-country  growth
regressions.
- 32 -is especially  imnportant  for political  questions, as the East Asian countries were by and large
modestly  authoritarian  but had very rapid growth.
V  What do the rates  of return indicate?
We have established  two results: higher levels of civil liberties are associated  with
better performance  on World Bank-financed  projects, and purely political liberties  and the type
of political  regime do not affect project performance. How should these findings  be
interpreted?
So far, we have used project ERRs as an indicator  without  being specific  about exactly
what they are an indicator  of.  Since the World Bank finances  only a fraction  of aid-financed
projects--and  an even smaller fraction any particular government's  investment  portfolio--it
cannot be assumed  that the ERRs of Bank projects are representative  of overall  government
returns. Do these results  apply to all aid-financed  projects? Is performance  of government-
implemented  projects a proxy for overall government  efficacy? More broadly, does the return
on these aid-fnanced government  projects reflect the return to all investments? We address
these questions  in the next three sections.
A) Are  IRank  projectc  une  among aid project?9
There is little reason to believe that World Bank-financed  projects are chosen very
differently  than  projects of other donor agencies. Moreover, it is particularly  unlikely  that the
selection  process for projects at the World Bank is biased in such a way as to produce results
for a relationship  between  projects and governance that would  not apply to projects of other
- 33 -donors.
R) Cinvernment  perfnrmrnice?
The more difficult  and important  questions is whether the ERRs of World Bank-
fmanced projects indicate  a degree of the efficacy of government  across  countries. There are
arguments for and against  this supposition.
On the one hand, since  all countries are treated alike by the World Bank  in terms of
project selection  and fund availability,  it is likely that systematic  differences  in project returns
do reflect country  specific,  rather than Bank specific factors. The Bank is quite centralized
and the internal standards  for project selection, appraisal, review, implementation  and
supervision  are uniform across  countries 36. In addition, in the determination  of lending
allocation--especially  of 'soft' IDA loans--there are pressures for an allocation  across  countries
based on considerations  other  than expected performance of projects.  Finally, the World
Bank's Articles of Agreement  have always been interpreted in such a way as to prevent an
explicit consideration  of political  factors so that project selection  at least in theory should  have
been exogenous  with respect  to the variables we are considering. Together, these factors
suggest  that differences  in ERRs across countries probably do not reflect large differences  in
Bank treatment  nor in project  selection rather it is likely that these  differences  reflect real
differences  in government  investment  returns across countries.
On the other hand, this cannot be established.  Countries  choose which  of their possible
36  This  was  even  more  true in the period  preceding  the reorganization  of 1987  which  decentralized  to the
regions many  formerly  central  functions.
- 34 -set of projects to finance  through  the World Bank.  This choice may involve  'cream skimming"
--governments  seeking  Bank  financing  for projects with very high expected  ERRs--or  'laggard
dumping"--governmnents  offering  the Bank the most problematic  projects. To the extent that
the mechanism  whereby  the government  and the Bank agree on which  projects  will be fimanced
differs across  countries, the average  return across countries cannot  be interpreted  as reflecting
government  performance.
The most worrisome  fact against an interpretation of ERRs as an indicator  of
government efficacy  is their lack of correlation with other measures  of government  efficacy.
The Business  Environmental  Risk Intelligence  (BERI) and International  Country  Risk Guide
(ICRG) data rank countries  by various characteristics  that indicate  their attractiveness  for
foreign investment--e.g.,  red tape encountered, corruption, and bureaucratic  delay. These
various measures  are not significantly  correlated with the ERRs in our data set: they are not
good measures  of the same  thing. It is possible that these private sector ratings  are flawed
indicators of government  effectiveness;  they are designed for foreign  investors,  and
governments  that are not attractive  to foreign investors may be reasonably  effective  in
implementing  their own projects. Nevertheless, the lack of correlation  of project  performance
with other indicators  of government  efficacy does raise questions.
- 35 -Q  Are projects  retimq  a  2proxy  for  overall  returns  tn  invertment?
In earlier work on the effect  of policy distortion variables--e.g., the black  market
premia--on  project performance  (Isham and Kaufmann 1995), it has been argued  that the ERRs
of World Bank-financed  projects  are reasonably representative  of overall investment
performance. How closely  related  are overall returns to capital and these ERRs? This is
difficult to answer as the economy-wide  return to capital is almost never measured.
A simple growth accounting  exercise  can circumvent  this measurement  problem.
Suppose that growth of output  per worker can be decomposed  into the growth  of capital  per
worker and a residual as in equation 1:
y  = ak*k
where lower case letters represent  per worker and the "dot" represents  the percentage  time rate




We typically  do not observe  r, the return on capital.  However, we hypothesize  that r for each
country I varies systematically  across  countries with the observed rate of return on projects,
ERR:
ri  = r  + P *ERRi
We can combine these three equations  and estimate the following  equation:
- 36  -= r*  *  +  *ERR*(  f)  *k
so that the first term identifies  the average  rate of return to capital and the second  parameter
the impact  of  an increase in ERR on the overall return to capital.  The results of estimating
this equation  using cross national  data are presented in table 11.  The estimated  average  return
varies between 10.2 and 17.8 percent, a reasonable  range of values.  The impact  of ERR on
the overall rate of return is between  0.44 and 1.08 (with  just two countries excluded).  The
estimates  suggest that the return on Bank projects, the ERR is related one-for-one  to the
economy-wide  rate of return which suggests  it is a very good proxy for overall investment
performance. This small piece of econometric  evidence fortifies the arguments  in earlier work
for the use of the ERR as an indicator of the economy-wide  rate of return.
However, the multicollinearity  problems  in identifying  the interactive  term are
extremely  severe. With just two variables, over 50 percent of the overall growth  rate variance
is explained  and hence the F-tests of joint exclusion are overwhelming. However,  the
estimates  of each term individually  are very imprecise  and cannot reject zero (or any other
value for that matter) for the the individual  terms.  We are obviously not happy  with this, but
see no solution.
- 37 -Table 11:  Relationship  of overall returns to capital and the country average  of project
rates of return (ERR).
Unweighted  Weighted  by number  of
projectsa
Full  Without  outliersb  Full  Without  outliersb
Return  to capital  .178  .102  .163  .106
(.107)c  (.116)  (.119)  (.878)
Impact of ERR on  .439  1.08  .626  1.06
return to capital  (.750)  (.821)  (.705)  (.722)
R-Squared  .450  .507  .345d  .506d
N  39  37  39  37
Notes: a) observations  are weighted  by the square root of the number of projects,  b) the two
outliers excluded  are Syria and Pakistan, c) standard errors in parentheses,  d)  R-squared  of
the unweighted  dependent  variable.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Cnnclusimn
No one would pretend  that the degree of civil or political liberties or the choice of
political  regime is--or ought to be--based  on an assessment  of strictly economic  costs and
benefits. What is often meant by the definition of  'human rights" are exactly  those  elements
of the interaction  of human  beings  that go beyond any social welfare calculus.
That said, we have presented  empirical  evidence that, beyond their intrinsic  merit, civil
liberties  have direct instrumental  benefits in improving the performance of a least  a subset  of
government  investment  projects, those  financed by the World Bank.  We believe  that this is an
additional  piece of evidence for the view that increasing  public voice and accountability--
- 38 -through  both participation  and better governance--can  lead to greater efficacy  in government
action, including  development  assistance (Picciotto 1994; OECD 1995).
On the other hand, the empirical evidence does not provide evidence  of a relationship
between "democracy'  and the particular performance  indicator  that we examine  (although  we
hasten to emphasize  the statistical  fact that lack of evidencefor is not necessarily  evidence
against). This merely suggests  with microeconomic  data that which is known  from aggregate
data: while some authoritarian  govermnents  have not provided  economic  benefits, other
countries  under authoritarian  regimes (particularly  in East Asia) have experienced  efficacious
governments,  widespread  economic  growth, and enormous  reductions  on poverty.
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-43 -Appendix  Table A. 1:  Summary  statistics of independent  variablesa
Variable  1  Mean  | Standard  Range  Number of  1  Years
nameb  |  Deviation  (Possible)  countries
A)  Civil liberties
Freedom  4.68  1.47  (1 to 7)  56  1974-1990
House
(Civil)  _
Humana  55.13  17.97  (13 to 91)  38  1986
Media  2.50  0.91  (1 to 4)  56  1985
Pluralism
Freedom to  2.45  1.12  (i to 4)  56  1985
organize  l
B)  Political Rights
Freedom  4.73  1.85  (1 to 7)  55  1974-1990
House
(Political)  _  _  l
Pourgerami  2.35  1.08  (1 to 4)  49  1984-86
Alesina  2.52  0.79  (I to 3)  55  1974-1982
Democracy
In d ex_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
C) Indicators of Civil Unrest  _
Riots  0.14  1.61  (-3.83 to  56  1974-1989
17.50)  l
Protest  0.29  1.63  (-0.79 to  56  1974-1989
Demonstra-  14.54)
tio n s  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Strikes  0.07  0.50  (-0.43 to  56  1974-1989
3.50)  l
Notes: a) Summary  statistics  from 1974 to 1990 for the 56 countries  with projects in Tobit
and IV specifications;  b) Data sources in the text and in the list of references.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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